Swords or plowshares? A theory of the security of claims to property.
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities. The model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons, which are the instruments of predation, and fortifications, which provide defense against predation. The ana...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Political Economy Vol. 103; pp. 1275 - 1289 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
University of Chicago Press
December 1995
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512712709&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512712709 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223808 JPE jtl: Journal of Political Economy issn: 00223808 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: December 1995 vid: 103 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 512712709 10.1086/601453 ppf: 1275 ppct: 14 formats: tig: atl: Swords or plowshares? A theory of the security of claims to property. aug: au: Grossman, Herschel I. Kim, Minseong su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economic equilibrium Mathematical models Military weapons Property rights sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economic equilibrium Mathematical models Military weapons Property rights keyword: Fortification -- Mathematical models ab: This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities. The model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons, which are the instruments of predation, and fortifications, which provide defense against predation. The analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. The analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium, in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure. We also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property. We find, for example, that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|