Axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary.
The writer formulates the principle of ordinal welfare egalitarianism in a general model of collective choice where feasibility constraints and preferences are clearly separated and where both are permitted to vary, and he presents an axiomatization of all choice rules satisfying this principle. He...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 68; pp. 77 - 111 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
January 1996
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The writer formulates the principle of ordinal welfare egalitarianism in a general model of collective choice where feasibility constraints and preferences are clearly separated and where both are permitted to vary, and he presents an axiomatization of all choice rules satisfying this principle. He states that the key axiom is a solidarity property with respect to changes that may take place, possibly jointly, in the feasibility constraints and the preferences. He contends that it is apparently stronger than the combination of these two properties due to the fact that it also concerns the effects of simultaneous changes in preferences and constraints. He checks that “feasibility solidarity” and “preference solidarity” together do not force ordinal welfare egalitarianism and reveals that they nevertheless imply a complicated form of “conditional” welfare egalitarianism. |
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