Optimal repeated purchases when sellers are learning about costs.
The writer discusses learning about suppliers' efficiency as an important aspect of the relationship between a large manufacturer and its suppliers. He presents a model to illustrate the problem confronting a buyer who wishes to purchase one unit of a good in each period from one set of potential s...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 68; pp. 440 - 456 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
February 1996
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512744212&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512744212 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: February 1996 vid: 68 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 512744212 10.1006/jeth.1996.0025 ppf: 440 ppct: 16 formats: tig: atl: Optimal repeated purchases when sellers are learning about costs. aug: au: Burguet, Roberto su: Industrial procurement Mathematical models of economics Cost Information theory in economics Mathematical models Industrial efficiency sug: subj: Industrial procurement Mathematical models of economics Cost Information theory in economics Mathematical models Industrial efficiency ab: The writer discusses learning about suppliers' efficiency as an important aspect of the relationship between a large manufacturer and its suppliers. He presents a model to illustrate the problem confronting a buyer who wishes to purchase one unit of a good in each period from one set of potential sellers and who is able to set and commit to the buying mechanism. He assumes that these potential sellers will privately learn their cost, which can vary for different sellers, only after producing the good once. He demonstrates that the first best efficient sampling rule is a search process with reservation values that increase over time. It is revealed that the sampling process stops at the first period in which some seller's cost is below the reservation value for that period and that, from then on, the good is permanently bought from the experienced seller with lowest cost. The writer demonstrates that this sampling rule can be implemented and that the purchaser extracts all the rents. The two mechanisms presented to attain this objective are outlined. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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