Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions.
The writer examines optimal regulation of a firm that has private information about both its cost and demand functions. He discusses Lewis and Sappington's (1998) analysis of this issue, considers a difficulty with their analysis, and proposes an alternative formulation of their model. He consider...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 84; no. 2; pp. 196 - 216 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
February 1999
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512758781&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512758781 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: February 1999 vid: 84 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 512758781 10.1006/jeth.1998.2482 ppf: 196 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: Optimal regulation with unknown demand and cost functions. aug: au: Armstrong, Mark su: Information theory in economics Mathematical models Direct costing Mathematical models of pricing Economic demand sug: subj: Information theory in economics Mathematical models Direct costing Mathematical models of pricing Economic demand ab: The writer examines optimal regulation of a firm that has private information about both its cost and demand functions. He discusses Lewis and Sappington's (1998) analysis of this issue, considers a difficulty with their analysis, and proposes an alternative formulation of their model. He considers two broad types of problem: the case where private and social incentives are roughly aligned, which implies that optimal prices are weakly above marginal costs; and the case where private and social incentives diverge, implying that pricing below marginal cost might be optimal. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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