The R&D incentives of industry leaders.

This paper presents a model to explain why industry leader firms often devote substantial resources to R&D activities and explores the welfare implications of this investment. The key new assumption is that industry leaders can improve their own products more easily than can other firms. When indu...

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Publicado en:International Economic Review Vol. 40; no. 3; pp. 745 - 767
Autores principales: Segerstrom, Paul S., Zolnierek, James M.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell August 1999
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The R&D incentives of industry leaders.
      aug:
        au:
          Segerstrom, Paul S.
          Zolnierek, James M.
      su:
        Mathematical finance
        Welfare economics
        Economic equilibrium
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Industrial research
        Mathematical models
        Finance
      sug:
        subj:
          Mathematical finance
          Welfare economics
          Economic equilibrium
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Industrial research
          Mathematical models
          Finance
      ab: This paper presents a model to explain why industry leader firms often devote substantial resources to R&D activities and explores the welfare implications of this investment. The key new assumption is that industry leaders can improve their own products more easily than can other firms. When industry leaders have R&D cost advantages, it is optimal for the government to subsidize the R&D expenditures of all firms, subsidize the production expenditures of industry leaders, and tax the profits of new industry leaders. Without government intervention, market forces generate too much creative destruction. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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