On the effects of entry in Cournot markets.

In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Review of Economic Studies pp. 235 - 255
Autores principales:	Amir, Rabah, Lambson, Val E.
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Oxford University Press / UK 2) (April 2000
Materias:	Welfare economics Market penetration Mathematical models of marketing Lattice theory Oligopolies Mathematical models
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost