Wealth constraints, lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation.
Part of a special issue on the papers and proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, held in Santiago de Compostela from September 1 to 4, 1999. Building on their analysis of the role of lobbying as a form of political participation that conveys information...
| Publicado en: | European Economic Review Vol. 44; no. 4/6; pp. 694 - 706 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Elsevier Science
May 2000
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512969230&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512969230 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00142921 EER jtl: European Economic Review issn: 00142921 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May 2000 vid: 44 iid: 4/6 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier Science artinfo: ui: 512969230 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00031-3 ppf: 694 ppct: 12 formats: tig: atl: Wealth constraints, lobbying and the efficiency of public allocation. aug: au: Esteban Joan Ray, Debraj su: Information theory in economics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Mathematical models of economic development Lobbyists Lobbying Mathematical models of political participation Wealth Mathematical models sug: subj: Information theory in economics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Mathematical models of economic development Lobbyists Lobbying Mathematical models of political participation Wealth Mathematical models ab: Part of a special issue on the papers and proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, held in Santiago de Compostela from September 1 to 4, 1999. Building on their analysis of the role of lobbying as a form of political participation that conveys information to the government on the value attached by each player to receiving a permission, the writers characterize the different types of equilibria and the corresponding losses that can arise under different distributions of wealth. They summarize their main approach and explore the special case of perfect wealth equality. Finally, they demonstrate that the nature of signaling equilibria is critically influenced by per-capita wealth. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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