Protecting the military.
A simple two-sector model—a military sector that produces security and a civilian sector that produces consumption goods—is used to analyze the equilibrium adjustment of labor resources following a favorable shock that lowers the marginal benefits of security provided by military personnel. The ana...
| Published in: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 63; pp. 993 - 1006 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Southern Economic Association
April 1997
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=512973202&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 512973202 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: April 1997 vid: 63 pid: 1482 pub: Southern Economic Association artinfo: ui: 512973202 10.2307/1061236 ppf: 993 ppct: 13 formats: tig: atl: Protecting the military. aug: au: Bielling, Deborah A. Garfinkel, Michelle R. su: Military reform United States armed forces Military base closures Decision making in military policy Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economics Game theory Human capital Mathematical models sug: subj: Military reform United States armed forces Military base closures Decision making in military policy Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economics Game theory Human capital Mathematical models ab: A simple two-sector model—a military sector that produces security and a civilian sector that produces consumption goods—is used to analyze the equilibrium adjustment of labor resources following a favorable shock that lowers the marginal benefits of security provided by military personnel. The analysis predicts a positive bias in military spending under the assumption that the reallocation of labor resources from one sector to another is not without cost. Upon realizing an advantageous shock to national security, the government faces a trade-off in moving labor resources to civilian production activities: Although the nation can enjoy both higher security and increased consumption, the displaced military personnel are forced to accept a lower utility than those who stay employed in that sector. If the adjustment costs are not too great, the ability to precommit would support a second-best policy that provides some protection to military personnel, while also realizing some of the increased consumption opportunities afforded by the favorable shock to national security. However, the government's inability to precommit leads to excessive protection of military workers, further limiting the adjustment of resources and the increased consumption opportunities realized in equilibrium. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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