Multiple-output agency incentives in data production: experimental evidence.
Part of a special issue on the papers and proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, which was held in Bogazi̧ci University in Istanbul, Turkey, on August 22-24, 1996. The writers interpret the production of sample surveys as a multiple output agency problem in...
| Publicado en: | European Economic Review Vol. 41; pp. 961 - 971 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier Science
April 1997
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Part of a special issue on the papers and proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, which was held in Bogazi̧ci University in Istanbul, Turkey, on August 22-24, 1996. The writers interpret the production of sample surveys as a multiple output agency problem in which interviewers serve as agents for the main investigator of the survey. They identify the fact that sampling error cannot be separated out from interviewer performance as the central aspect of data production that generates the agency problem. They contend that contract effects on data production are important because the quality-quantity incentives confronting interviewers affect the survey in terms of bias and sample size. To explore direct proof relating to the quality-quantity trade-offs in the production of attitudinal surveys, they examine an experiment through which piece-rate and fixed wage contracts were randomly assigned across interviewers. |
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