Motivating wealth-constrained actors.
We examine how owners of productive resources (e.g., public enterprises or financial capital) optimally allocate their resources among wealth-constrained operators of unknown ability. Optimal allocations exhibit: (1) shared enterprise profit—the resource owner always shares the operator's profit;...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 90; no. 4; pp. 944 - 961 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
American Economic Association
September 2000
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513014615&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513014615 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: September 2000 vid: 90 iid: 4 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 513014615 10.1257/aer.90.4.944 ppf: 944 ppct: 17 formats: tig: atl: Motivating wealth-constrained actors. aug: au: Lewis, Tracy R. Sappington, David E. M. su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Wealth Mathematical models sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Wealth Mathematical models ab: We examine how owners of productive resources (e.g., public enterprises or financial capital) optimally allocate their resources among wealth-constrained operators of unknown ability. Optimal allocations exhibit: (1) shared enterprise profit—the resource owner always shares the operator's profit; (2) dispersed enterprise ownership—resources are widely distributed among operators of varying ability; (3) limited benefits of competition—the owner may not benefit from increased competition for the resource; and, sometimes, (4) diluted incentives for the most capable—more capable operators receive smaller shares of the returns they generate. Implications for privatizations and venture capital arrangements are explored. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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