Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior.
Consider an exchange economy where agents are arbitragers, in that they try to upset allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. With an introspective algorithm, each agent constructs an interactive choice set (ICS), i.e., a set of bundles that he considers achievable through a sequence of pl...
| Published in: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 95; no. 1; pp. 79 - 107 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Academic Press Inc.
November 2000
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513035550&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513035550 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: November 2000 vid: 95 iid: 1 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513035550 10.1006/jeth.2000.2680 ppf: 79 ppct: 28 formats: tig: atl: Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior. aug: au: Serrano, Roberto Volij, Oscar su: Welfare economics Mathematical models Auctions Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Welfare economics Mathematical models Auctions Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: Consider an exchange economy where agents are arbitragers, in that they try to upset allocations imagining plausible beneficial trades. With an introspective algorithm, each agent constructs an interactive choice set (ICS), i.e., a set of bundles that he considers achievable through a sequence of plausible trades with other agents. We show that Walrasian allocations can be characterized as those where each agent chooses optimally from his ICS, which is always contained in a budget set (with differentiability, both sets coincide). Our analysis provides a different behavioral assumption underlying Walrasian allocations, offers an explanation for the source of competitive prices, and connects with the core convergence theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D00, D51. Copyright 2000 Academic Press. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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