Markets for water rights under environmental constraints.
The cumulative impact of pollutants on water quality at a given location along a river is a function of prior loadings, as well as pollution and surface flows at that particular site. The question of whether it is possible to maintain water quality under alternative mechanisms for allocating surface...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Environmental Economics & Management Vol. 42; no. 1; pp. 53 - 65 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
July 2001
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513039246&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513039246 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00950696 EEM jtl: Journal of Environmental Economics & Management issn: 00950696 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: July 2001 vid: 42 iid: 1 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513039246 10.1006/jeem.2000.1149 ppf: 53 ppct: 12 formats: tig: atl: Markets for water rights under environmental constraints. aug: au: Weber, Marian L. su: Water rights Water pollution Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Water rights Water pollution Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: The cumulative impact of pollutants on water quality at a given location along a river is a function of prior loadings, as well as pollution and surface flows at that particular site. The question of whether it is possible to maintain water quality under alternative mechanisms for allocating surface water and pollution rights is addressed. We model the optimal allocation of surface water and pollution rights along a river with water quality constraints. Due to cumulative effects, the shadow values of water and pollution rights are contingent on location. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium in a market for tradable surface water rights in conjunction with a market for pollution damages implements the optimal solution. The market supports location-specific prices for both consumptive water rights and pollution damages. Copyright 2001 Academic Press. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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