A new solution to the random assignment problem.
A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabil...
| Published in: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 100; no. 2; pp. 295 - 329 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Academic Press Inc.
October 2001
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513067277&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513067277 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2001 vid: 100 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513067277 10.1006/jeth.2000.2710 ppf: 295 ppct: 34 formats: tig: atl: A new solution to the random assignment problem. aug: au: Bogomolnaia, Anna Moulin, Hervé su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Rational choice theory Random variables sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Rational choice theory Random variables ab: A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. PS is envy-free, RP is not; RP is strategy-proof, PS is not. Ordinal efficiency, Strategyproofness, and equal treatment of equals are incompatible. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D61, D63. Copyright 2001 Academic Press. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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