Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value.
We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanis...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 100; no. 2; pp. 274 - 295 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
October 2001
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513067278&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513067278 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2001 vid: 100 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513067278 10.1006/jeth.2000.2704 ppf: 274 ppct: 21 formats: tig: atl: Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value. aug: au: Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein, David su: Economics Game theory Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Economics Game theory Resource allocation -- Mathematical models keyword: Shapley value ab: We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values. Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72. Copyright 2001 Academic Press. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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