House allocation with transfers.
We consider the Shapley–Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget-balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advan...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 100; no. 2; pp. 329 - 356 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
October 2001
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513067280&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513067280 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2001 vid: 100 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513067280 10.1006/jeth.2000.2703 ppf: 329 ppct: 27 formats: tig: atl: House allocation with transfers. aug: au: Miyagawa, Eiichi su: Core & periphery (Economic theory) Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Core & periphery (Economic theory) Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: We consider the Shapley–Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget-balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley–Scarf economy associated with the prices. The special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanism studied by Shapley and Scarf. Our mechanisms are compelling alternatives to the Groves mechanisms, which satisfy neither budget balance nor our condition of collusion-proofness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78, D89. Copyright 2001 Academic Press. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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