Competitive fair division.

Several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players, whose bids for the goods determine their prices. An equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair-division procedure, called the Gap Procedure, that ensures (1) nonnegative prices that never exceed t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of Political Economy Vol. 109; no. 2; pp. 418 - 444
Main Authors: Brams, Steven J., Kilgour, D. Marc
Format: Article
Published: University of Chicago Press April 2001
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Competitive fair division.
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        au:
          Brams, Steven J.
          Kilgour, D. Marc
      su:
        Economics
        Indivisibles (Philosophy)
        Game theory
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Fairness
      sug:
        subj:
          Economics
          Indivisibles (Philosophy)
          Game theory
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Fairness
      keyword: Indivisible goods
      ab: Several indivisible goods are to be divided among two or more players, whose bids for the goods determine their prices. An equitable assignment of the goods at competitive prices is given by a fair-division procedure, called the Gap Procedure, that ensures (1) nonnegative prices that never exceed the bid of the player receiving the goods; (2) Pareto optimality, though coupled with possible envy; (3)monotonicity, such that higher bids never hurt in obtaining a good; (4) sincere bids that preclude negative utility; and (5) prices that are partially independent of the amounts bid (as in a Vickery auction). A variety of applications are discussed. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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    language: English
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