Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?
This paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies-contrary to existing practices. Instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform, the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Development Economics Vol. 70; no. 2; pp. 381 - 403 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Elsevier Science
April 2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513132156&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513132156 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03043878 JDE jtl: Journal of Development Economics issn: 03043878 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: April 2003 vid: 70 iid: 2 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier Science artinfo: ui: 513132156 10.1016/S0304-3878(02)00102-5 ppf: 381 ppct: 22 formats: tig: atl: Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it? aug: au: Svensson, Jakob su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models International economic assistance Mathematical models Foreign loans Opportunity costs sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models International economic assistance Mathematical models Foreign loans Opportunity costs ab: This paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies-contrary to existing practices. Instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform, the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries. The actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance. This explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two important advantages as compared to present practices. First, it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post, thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies. Second, competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks, which otherwise conceal the recipient's choice of action. This enables the donor to give aid more efficiently. Copyright (c) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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