Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab.
This paper explores how wealth and inequality can affect self-governed solutions to commons dilemmas by constraining group cooperation. It reports a series of experiments in the field where subjects are actual commons users. Household data about the participants' context explain statistically the us...
| Published in: | Journal of Development Economics Vol. 70; no. 2; pp. 263 - 290 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Elsevier Science
April 2003
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513132175&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513132175 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03043878 JDE jtl: Journal of Development Economics issn: 03043878 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: April 2003 vid: 70 iid: 2 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier Science artinfo: ui: 513132175 10.1016/S0304-3878(02)00098-6 ppf: 263 ppct: 27 formats: tig: atl: Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab. aug: au: Cardenas, Juan-Camilo su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Commons dilemma game Mathematical models Cooperation Experimental economics sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Commons dilemma game Mathematical models Cooperation Experimental economics ab: This paper explores how wealth and inequality can affect self-governed solutions to commons dilemmas by constraining group cooperation. It reports a series of experiments in the field where subjects are actual commons users. Household data about the participants' context explain statistically the usually observed wide variation found within and across groups in similar experiments. Participants' wealth and inequality reduced cooperation when groups were allowed to have face-to-face communication between rounds. There are implications for a greater awareness of nonpayoff asymmetries affecting cooperation in heterogeneous groups, apart from heterogeneity in the payoffs structure of the game. Copyright (c) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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