Public-Good Provision with Many Participants.

For a nonexcludable public good with benefit and cost functions independent of the number of participants, this paper studies second-best allocations under Bayesian interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. As the number of participants becomes large, second-best provision...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Review of Economic Studies Vol. 70; no. 3; pp. 589 - 615
Autor principal: Hellwig, Martin F.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / UK July 2003
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513141161&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: ssf
    uiTerm: 513141161
    longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00346527
        REM
      jtl: Review of Economic Studies
      issn: 00346527
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: July 2003
      vid: 70
      iid: 3
      pid: 622
      pub: Oxford University Press / UK
    artinfo:
      ui:
        513141161
        10.1111/1467-937X.00257
      ppf: 589
      ppct: 26
      formats:
      tig:
        atl: Public-Good Provision with Many Participants.
      aug:
        au: Hellwig, Martin F.
      su:
        Mathematical models of consumption
        Public goods
        Bayesian analysis
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
      sug:
        subj:
          Mathematical models of consumption
          Public goods
          Bayesian analysis
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
      ab: For a nonexcludable public good with benefit and cost functions independent of the number of participants, this paper studies second-best allocations under Bayesian interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. As the number of participants becomes large, second-best provision levels converge in distribution to first-best levels if the latter are bounded. Second-best provision levels become large in absolute terms but small relative to first-best levels if benefit and cost functions are isoelastic. In contrast, for an excludable public good, the ratio of second-best to first-best levels is bounded away from zero. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: N
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N