Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise.
To analyse the effect of asset inequality on co-operation within a group, we consider a two-player nonco-operative model of conservation of a common-pool resource. Overexploitation by one user affects another's payoff by reducing the next-period catch. We give necessary and sufficient conditions s...
| Publicado en: | Economic Journal Vol. 112; pp. 577 - 603 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
July 2002
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513144373&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513144373 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00130133 EJN jtl: Economic Journal issn: 00130133 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: July 2002 vid: 112 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 513144373 10.1111/1468-0297.00731 ppf: 577 ppct: 26 formats: tig: atl: Inequality and Conservation on the Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise. aug: au: Dayton-Johnson, Jeff Bardhan, Pranab su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Fisheries Mathematical models Conservation of natural resources Commons dilemma game sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Fisheries Mathematical models Conservation of natural resources Commons dilemma game ab: To analyse the effect of asset inequality on co-operation within a group, we consider a two-player nonco-operative model of conservation of a common-pool resource. Overexploitation by one user affects another's payoff by reducing the next-period catch. We give necessary and sufficient conditions such that conservation is a Nash equilibrium, and show that increasing inequality does not, in general, favour full conservation. However, once inequality is sufficiently great, further inequality can raise efficiency. Thus, the relationship between inequality and economic efficiency is U-shaped. Finally, we analyse the implications for conservation if players have earning opportunities outside the commons. Reproduced by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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