Self-selection consistent functions.
This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 105; no. 2; pp. 263 - 278 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Academic Press Inc.
August 2002
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513147751&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513147751 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: August 2002 vid: 105 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513147751 10.1006/jeth.2001.2860 ppf: 263 ppct: 15 formats: tig: atl: Self-selection consistent functions. aug: au: Barberà, Salvador Beviá, Carmen su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Social choice Mathematical models sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Social choice Mathematical models ab: This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing efficient allocation consistent rules. We also explore whether such rules may in addition respect the Condorcet criterion. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D7, D71.|Sc 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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