Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences.

Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characteri...

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Published in:Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 105; no. 2; pp. 408 - 435
Main Authors: Ehlers, Lars, Peters, Hans, Storcken, Ton
Format: Article
Published: Academic Press Inc. August 2002
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      dt: August 2002
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      pub: Academic Press Inc.
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        10.1006/jeth.2001.2829
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        atl: Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences.
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        au:
          Ehlers, Lars
          Peters, Hans
          Storcken, Ton
      su:
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Probability theory
        Group decision making
        Mathematical models
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        subj:
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Probability theory
          Group decision making
          Mathematical models
      ab: Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterization of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin (Public Choice |Wb35[|WB] (1980), 437–455). Thereby, the work of Moulin (1980) is extended to the probabilistic framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D81. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA)
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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