Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation.
We consider house allocation without endowments. We show that there is a unique maximal domain including all strict preferences on which efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness are compatible. A preference relation belongs to the unique maximal domain if it is a strict descending ranking of ho...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 105; no. 2; pp. 298 - 318 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
August 2002
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513147783&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513147783 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: August 2002 vid: 105 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513147783 10.1006/jeth.2001.2813 ppf: 298 ppct: 20 formats: tig: atl: Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation. aug: au: Ehlers, Lars su: Housing Mathematical models of supply & demand Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economics Indivisibles (Philosophy) Social choice Mathematical models sug: subj: Housing Mathematical models of supply & demand Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economics Indivisibles (Philosophy) Social choice Mathematical models keyword: Indivisible goods ab: We consider house allocation without endowments. We show that there is a unique maximal domain including all strict preferences on which efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness are compatible. A preference relation belongs to the unique maximal domain if it is a strict descending ranking of houses to a certain house and indifference holds over it and the remaining houses. We also show that on this domain mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D63, D71. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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