Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies.

A fundamentals based monetary policy rule, which would be the optimal monetary policy without commitment when private agents have perfectly rational expectations, is unstable if in fact these agents follow standard adaptive learning rules. This problem can be overcome if private expectations are obs...

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Publicado en:Review of Economic Studies Vol. 70; no. 4; pp. 807 - 825
Autores principales: Evans, George W., Honkapohja, Seppo
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / UK October 2003
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies.
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          Evans, George W.
          Honkapohja, Seppo
      su:
        Mathematical models of monetary policy
        Rational expectations (Economic theory)
        Economic equilibrium
      sug:
        subj:
          Mathematical models of monetary policy
          Rational expectations (Economic theory)
          Economic equilibrium
      ab: A fundamentals based monetary policy rule, which would be the optimal monetary policy without commitment when private agents have perfectly rational expectations, is unstable if in fact these agents follow standard adaptive learning rules. This problem can be overcome if private expectations are observed and suitably incorporated into the policy maker's optimal rule. These strong results extend to the case in which there is simultaneous learning by the policy maker and the private agents. Our findings show the importance of conditioning policy appropriately, not just on fundamentals, but also directly on observed household and firm expectations. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
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      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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