Beliefs and Pareto efficient sets: a remark.
We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence clas...
| Published in: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 106; no. 2; pp. 467 - 472 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Academic Press Inc.
October 2002
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | We show that, in a two-period economy with uncertainty in the second period, if an allocation is Pareto optimal for a given set of beliefs and remains optimal when these beliefs are changed, then the set of optimal allocations of the two economies must actually coincide. We identify equivalence classes of beliefs, giving rise to the same set of Pareto optimal allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D61. |Sc 2002 Elsevier Science (USA) |
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