Lotteries, sunspots, and incentive constraints.

We study a prototypical class of exchange economies with private information and indivisibilities. We establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the welfare and existence theorems hold. To establish these results, we introduce the concept of the stand-in...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 107; no. 1; pp. 39 - 70
Autores principales: Kehoe, Timothy J., Levine, David K., Prescott, Edward C.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. November 2002
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:We study a prototypical class of exchange economies with private information and indivisibilities. We establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the welfare and existence theorems hold. To establish these results, we introduce the concept of the stand-in consumer economy, which is a standard, convex, finite consumer, finite good, pure exchange economy. With decreasing absolute risk aversion and no indivisibilities, we prove that no lotteries are actually used in equilibrium. We provide a simple numerical example with increasing absolute risk aversion in which lotteries are necessarily used in equilibrium. We also show how the equilibrium allocation in this example can be implemented in a sunspot equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D11, D50, D82.|Sc 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)