Optimal Auction with Resale.

This paper investigates the design of seller-optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good. In that case, the optimal allocation characterized by Myerson (1981) cannot be achieved without resale. I find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibi...

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Publicado en:Econometrica Vol. 70; no. 6; pp. 2197 - 2225
Autor principal: Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell November 2002
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Optimal Auction with Resale.
      aug:
        au: Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
      su:
        Auctions
        Mathematical models
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
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        subj:
          Auctions
          Mathematical models
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
      ab: This paper investigates the design of seller-optimal auctions when winning bidders can attempt to resell the good. In that case, the optimal allocation characterized by Myerson (1981) cannot be achieved without resale. I find a sufficient and necessary condition for sincere bidding given the possibility of resale. In two-bidder cases, I prove that the Myerson allocation can be achieved under standard conditions supplemented with two assumptions. With three or more bidders, achieving the Myerson allocation is more difficult. I prove that it can be implemented in special cases. In those cases, the Myerson allocation is generated through a sequence of resale auctions, each optimally chosen by a reseller. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
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    language: English
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