The package assignment model.
We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be no...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 107; no. 2; pp. 377 - 407 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Academic Press Inc.
December 2002
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513159468&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513159468 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: December 2002 vid: 107 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513159468 10.1006/jeth.2001.2957 ppf: 377 ppct: 30 formats: tig: atl: The package assignment model. aug: au: Bikhchandani, Sushil Ostroy, Joseph M. su: Auctions Mathematical models Assignment problems (Programming) Linear programming Economic equilibrium sug: subj: Auctions Mathematical models Assignment problems (Programming) Linear programming Economic equilibrium ab: We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non-linear in the objects constituting the packages. The interconnections among the linear programming formulation, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core are established. In the single seller (auction) version, a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the Vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D44, D51. |Sc 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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