Sharing a river.
A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it c...
| Published in: | Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 107; no. 2; pp. 453 - 463 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Academic Press Inc.
December 2002
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513159636&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513159636 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220531 RTH jtl: Journal of Economic Theory issn: 00220531 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: December 2002 vid: 107 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 513159636 10.1006/jeth.2001.2949 ppf: 453 ppct: 10 formats: tig: atl: Sharing a river. aug: au: Ambec, Stefan Sprumont, Yves su: Water rights Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Welfare economics Water Economics sug: subj: Water rights Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Welfare economics Water Economics ab: A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds: it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D62, C71. |Sc 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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