Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach.
A multibidding mechanism that is budget-balanced is developed to address the problem of choosing an efficient project alternative by a group of agents with conflicting interests, based on the Nash equilibria. Findings reveal that all Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism are efficient, that is...
| Publicado en: | American Economic Review Vol. 92; no. 5; pp. 1577 - 1588 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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American Economic Association
December 2002
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513160547&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513160547 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: December 2002 vid: 92 iid: 5 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 513160547 10.1257/000282802762024647 ppf: 1577 ppct: 11 formats: tig: atl: Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach. aug: au: Pérez-Castrillo, David Wettstein, David su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economics Game theory Economic equilibrium Social choice Mathematical models sug: subj: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Economics Game theory Economic equilibrium Social choice Mathematical models ab: A multibidding mechanism that is budget-balanced is developed to address the problem of choosing an efficient project alternative by a group of agents with conflicting interests, based on the Nash equilibria. Findings reveal that all Nash equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism are efficient, that is, that the project chosen in equilibrium is efficient. A detailed analysis is provided of the structure of the equilibria outcomes and their ranking by the participating agents, and it is shown that, at equilibrium, each agent's payoff is at least that which he or she would expect in a situation where all the projects under consideration have the same probability of being developed. Findings imply that the complete-information framework of the mechanism enables the derivation of a powerful efficiency result and that it can serve as a benchmark for the study of environments with incomplete information. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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