Toward a Monistic Theory of Science: The ‘Strong Programme’ Reconsidered.
A study was conducted to assess the validity of the “Strong Programme” account of scientific knowledge, which assumes that the logics of interest and of instrumental adequacy are not dualistic and potentially conflicting but are one and the same. The findings, although conceding that the Strong Pro...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of the Social Sciences Vol. 33; no. 3; pp. 311 - 339 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Sage Publications Inc.
2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513165685&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513165685 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483931 CIA jtl: Philosophy of the Social Sciences issn: 00483931 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2003 vid: 33 iid: 3 pid: 344 pub: Sage Publications Inc. artinfo: ui: 513165685 10.1177/0048393103252780 ppf: 311 ppct: 28 formats: tig: atl: Toward a Monistic Theory of Science: The ‘Strong Programme’ Reconsidered. aug: au: Kemp, Stephen su: Monism Sociology of knowledge Scientific knowledge Classification sug: subj: Monism Sociology of knowledge Scientific knowledge Classification ab: A study was conducted to assess the validity of the “Strong Programme” account of scientific knowledge, which assumes that the logics of interest and of instrumental adequacy are not dualistic and potentially conflicting but are one and the same. The findings, although conceding that the Strong Programme approach is flawed, differ from the more standard criticisms by suggesting that its monistic approach be refined, rather than replaced with an alternative dualistic framework. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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