Blackwell's ordering and public information.

We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (Amer. Econom. Rev. 61 (1971) 561) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competit...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Journal of Economic Theory Vol. 114; no. 2; pp. 179 - 198
Autor principal: Campbell, Colin M.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Academic Press Inc. February 2004
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Blackwell's ordering and public information.
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        au: Campbell, Colin M.
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        Blackwell, David, 1919-2010
        Information theory in economics
        Welfare economics
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Uncertainty
        Economics
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        subj:
          Information theory in economics
          Welfare economics
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Uncertainty
          Economics
          Blackwell, David, 1919-2010
      ab: We characterize a precise comparative static on welfare and the amount of public information in an economy under uncertainty. Results dating to Hirshleifer (Amer. Econom. Rev. 61 (1971) 561) have suggested that information can have negative value in such a setting, but counterexamples using competitive equilibrium outcomes have suppressed general results to this effect. We show that under the solution concept of implementable allocations, the negative relationship between more public information in the sense of Blackwell and welfare is fully general. Furthermore, Blackwell's ranking is necessary as well as sufficient to obtain our ranking, and hence ours provides an equivalent characterization of his ordering. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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    language: English
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