Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good.

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions...

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Published in:Econometrica Vol. 72; no. 2; pp. 627 - 641
Main Authors: Maniquet, François, Sprumont, Yves
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell March 2004
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good.
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          Maniquet, François
          Sprumont, Yves
      su:
        Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
        Public goods
        Mathematical models of consumption
        Welfare economics
      sug:
        subj:
          Resource allocation -- Mathematical models
          Public goods
          Mathematical models of consumption
          Welfare economics
      ab: We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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