Politics, information and the urban bias.
Governments in many LDCs skew public resources towards urban sectors, despite a majority of citizens residing in rural areas. This paper develops a novel political argument for this urban-bias phenomenon in a framework where all voters, rural and urban, have equal voice, but differ in their access t...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Development Economics Vol. 75; no. 1; pp. 137 - 166 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier Science
October 2004
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513175552&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513175552 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03043878 JDE jtl: Journal of Development Economics issn: 03043878 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2004 vid: 75 iid: 1 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier Science artinfo: ui: 513175552 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.08.003 ppf: 137 ppct: 29 formats: tig: atl: Politics, information and the urban bias. aug: au: Majumdar, Sumon Mani, Anandi Mukand, Sharun W. su: Mathematical models Rural urban differences Information theory Political science Resource allocation -- Mathematical models sug: subj: Mathematical models Rural urban differences Information theory Political science Resource allocation -- Mathematical models ab: Governments in many LDCs skew public resources towards urban sectors, despite a majority of citizens residing in rural areas. This paper develops a novel political argument for this urban-bias phenomenon in a framework where all voters, rural and urban, have equal voice, but differ in their access to information. We argue that this difference is sufficient to give governments an incentive to inefficiently over-allocate resources towards urban areas. The bias is shown to worsen during adverse economic times, leading to increased migration. We also examine how voter informativeness affects efficiency of the electoral process in weeding out incompetent governments. Copyright (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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