Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana.
Various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation. In this paper, we investigate a formula-based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to deter...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Development Economics Vol. 96; no. 2; pp. 380 - 391 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Elsevier Science
November 2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=513192149&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 513192149 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03043878 JDE jtl: Journal of Development Economics issn: 03043878 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: November 2011 vid: 96 iid: 2 pid: 1004 pub: Elsevier Science artinfo: ui: 513192149 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.08.012 ppf: 380 ppct: 11 formats: tig: atl: Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana. aug: au: Banful, Afua Branoah su: Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Intergovernmental fiscal relations Mathematical models Local government Ghana sug: subj: Ghana Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Intergovernmental fiscal relations Mathematical models Local government keyword: Finance, Public -- Ghana ab: Various countries have adopted formulas for determining intergovernmental transfers as a strategy to limit the role of political considerations in resource allocation. In this paper, we investigate a formula-based system of allocating resources from a central government to local governments to determine whether the political characteristics of recipient areas have any bearing on their allocation. Specifically, we study the sharing of resources of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) in Ghana amongst the country's district governments over the period 1994 to 2005. We find evidence that the mechanism does not eliminate politically motivated targeting of the grants. Per capita DACF grants were higher in districts where vote margins in the previous presidential election were lower, suggesting that swing districts were targeted. We find evidence that DACF formula indicators and their weighting were chosen and amended to produce politically desired patterns of transfers. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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