Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity.

How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga do...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 149; no. 3; pp. 321 - 327
Autor principal: Wilson, Alastair
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jul2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Epistemics
        Elga, Adam
        Research
        Structural frames
        Bayesian analysis
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          Epistemics
          Elga, Adam
          Research
          Structural frames
          Bayesian analysis
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        Averaging
        Commutativity
        Credences
        Disagreement
        Epistemic peer
        Equal weight view
        Evidence
      ab: How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.
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