What time travelers may be able to do.

Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, ), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a...

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Published in:Philosophical Studies Vol. 150; no. 1; pp. 115 - 122
Main Author: Vranas, Peter B. M.
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Aug2010
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Vranas, Peter B. M.
        affil: University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 53706, USA.
      su:
        Voyages & travels
        Tourism
        Vihvelin, Kadri
        Spacetime
        Imaginary voyages
      sug:
        subj:
          Voyages & travels
          Tourism
          Vihvelin, Kadri
          Spacetime
          Imaginary voyages
      keyword:
        Time travel
        Vihvelin
      ab: Kadri Vihvelin, in “What time travelers cannot do” (Philos Stud 81:315–330, ), argued that “no time traveler can kill the baby who in fact is her younger self”, because (V1) “if someone would fail to do something, no matter how hard or how many times she tried, then she cannot do it”, and (V2) if a time traveler tried to kill her baby self, she would always fail. Theodore Sider (Philos Stud 110:115–138, ) criticized Vihvelin’s argument, and Ira Kiourti (Philos Stud 139:343–352, ) criticized both Vihvelin’s argument and Sider’s critique. I present a critique of Vihvelin’s argument different from both Sider’s and Kiourti’s critiques: I argue in a novel way that both V1 and V2 are false. Since Vihvelin’s argument might be understood as providing a challenge to the possibility of time travel, if my critique succeeds then time travel survives such a challenge unscathed.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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