Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.
Kadri Vihvelin has recently argued that between compatibilists and incompatibilists, the incompatibilists have a greater dialectical burden than compatibilists. According to her, both must show that free will is possible, but beyond this the incompatibilists must also show that no deterministic worl...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 429 - 444 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=52237045&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 52237045 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2010 vid: 88 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 52237045 10.1080/00048400903233811 ppf: 429 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 129KB tig: atl: Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right. aug: au: McKenna, Michael affil: Florida State University su: Dialectic Vihvelin, Kadri Free will & determinism Determinism (Philosophy) Discourse ethics Logic sug: subj: Dialectic Vihvelin, Kadri Free will & determinism Determinism (Philosophy) Discourse ethics Logic ab: Kadri Vihvelin has recently argued that between compatibilists and incompatibilists, the incompatibilists have a greater dialectical burden than compatibilists. According to her, both must show that free will is possible, but beyond this the incompatibilists must also show that no deterministic worlds are free will worlds. Thus, according to Vihvelin, so long as it is established that free will is possible, all the compatibilist must do is show that the incompatibilists' arguments are ineffective. I resist Vihvelin's assessment of the dialectical burdens of compatibilists and incompatibilists, as well as her assessment of the best arguments for incompatibilism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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