Necessity and Triviality.
In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 401 - 416 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=52237047&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 52237047 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2010 vid: 88 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 52237047 10.1080/00048400903213763 ppf: 401 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 124KB tig: atl: Necessity and Triviality. aug: au: Cameron, RossP. affil: University of Leeds su: Necessity (Philosophy) Philosophy of language Truth Sentences (Grammar) Tropes (Philosophy) Philosophy of mathematics sug: subj: Necessity (Philosophy) Philosophy of language Truth Sentences (Grammar) Tropes (Philosophy) Philosophy of mathematics ab: In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of the demands the truth of a sentence makes, lest we be blinded to certain conceptual possibilities. I defend the claim that the truths of pure mathematics and set theory are trivially true, and hence accepting their truth brings no ontological commitment; I further defend the claim that the truths of applied mathematics and set theory do not demand the existence of numbers or sets. While the notion of a demand must not be reduced to anything modal, I nonetheless argue that sentences that are trivially true must also be necessary, lest we violate a very weak version of the principle that truth depends on the world. I further argue that all necessary truths are trivially true, lest we admit unexplained necessities. I end by showing one important consequence of this: I argue that if there are truthmakers for intrinsic predications, they must be states of affairs rather than tropes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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