Necessity and Triviality.

In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of...

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Publicado en:Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 401 - 416
Autor principal: Cameron, RossP.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd Sep2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Necessity and Triviality.
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        affil: University of Leeds
      su:
        Necessity (Philosophy)
        Philosophy of language
        Truth
        Sentences (Grammar)
        Tropes (Philosophy)
        Philosophy of mathematics
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        subj:
          Necessity (Philosophy)
          Philosophy of language
          Truth
          Sentences (Grammar)
          Tropes (Philosophy)
          Philosophy of mathematics
      ab: In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of the demands the truth of a sentence makes, lest we be blinded to certain conceptual possibilities. I defend the claim that the truths of pure mathematics and set theory are trivially true, and hence accepting their truth brings no ontological commitment; I further defend the claim that the truths of applied mathematics and set theory do not demand the existence of numbers or sets. While the notion of a demand must not be reduced to anything modal, I nonetheless argue that sentences that are trivially true must also be necessary, lest we violate a very weak version of the principle that truth depends on the world. I further argue that all necessary truths are trivially true, lest we admit unexplained necessities. I end by showing one important consequence of this: I argue that if there are truthmakers for intrinsic predications, they must be states of affairs rather than tropes.
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    language: English
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