Interregional Redistribution and Mobility in Federations: A Positive Approach.
The paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice. We find that paradoxical consequences of interjurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile: while self-sufficient regions are necessarily identical with respect t...
| Publicado en: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 78; no. 4; pp. 1345 - 1379 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / UK
October 2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=525578970&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 525578970 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: October 2011 vid: 78 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / UK artinfo: ui: 525578970 ppf: 1345 ppct: 34 formats: tig: atl: Interregional Redistribution and Mobility in Federations: A Positive Approach. aug: au: Kessler, Anke S. Hansen, Nico A. Lessmann, Christian su: Economics & politics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Intergovernmental fiscal relations sug: subj: Economics & politics Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Intergovernmental fiscal relations ab: The paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice. We find that paradoxical consequences of interjurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile: while self-sufficient regions are necessarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model, interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes. Thus, interregional redistribution prevents interregional equality. At the same time, however, transfers may allow for more interpersonal equality among the inhabitants of each region. The voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence. Empirical evidence from panel data from OECD countries and Canadian provinces is consistent with the theory. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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