HOW TO CONFUSE ORGANISMS WITH MOUSETRAPS: MACHINE METAPHORS AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN.
Why do design arguments—particularly those emphasizing machine metaphors such as “Organisms and/or their parts are machines”—continue to be so convincing to so many people after they have been repeatedly refuted? In this essay I review various interpretations and refutations of design arguments and...
| Publicado en: | Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science Vol. 45; no. 3; pp. 647 - 665 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Open Library of Humanities
Sep2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=52694672&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 52694672 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 05912385 ZYG jtl: Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science issn: 05912385 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2010 vid: 45 iid: 3 pid: 15576 pub: Open Library of Humanities artinfo: ui: 52694672 10.1111/j.1467-9744.2010.01119.x ppf: 647 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 103KB tig: atl: HOW TO CONFUSE ORGANISMS WITH MOUSETRAPS: MACHINE METAPHORS AND INTELLIGENT DESIGN. aug: au: Recker, Doren affil: Associate Professor and Head of the Philosophy Department at Oklahoma State University, 308 Hanner Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078–5064; e-mail . su: Agent (Philosophy) Teleological proof of God Intelligent design (Teleology) Cognitive psychology Developmental psychology Machinery Metaphor sug: subj: Agent (Philosophy) Teleological proof of God Intelligent design (Teleology) Cognitive psychology Developmental psychology Machinery Metaphor keyword: agency and teleological bias cognitive psychology cognitive status of metaphors design arguments developmental psychology dual process reasoning intelligent design machine metaphors ab: Why do design arguments—particularly those emphasizing machine metaphors such as “Organisms and/or their parts are machines”—continue to be so convincing to so many people after they have been repeatedly refuted? In this essay I review various interpretations and refutations of design arguments and make a distinction between rationally refuting such arguments (Refuting) and rendering them psychologically unconvincing (Refuting). Expanding on this distinction, I provide support from recent work on the cognitive power of metaphors and developmental psychological work indicating a basic human propensity toward attributing agency to natural events, to show that design arguments “make sense” unless one is cued to look more closely. As with visual illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer arrow illusion, there is nothing wrong with a believer's cognitive apparatus any more than with their visual apparatus when they judge the lines in the illusion to be of unequal length. It takes training or a dissonance between design beliefs and other beliefs or experiences to play the role that a ruler does in the visual case. Unless people are cued to “look again” at what initially makes perfect sense, they are not inclined to apply more sophisticated evaluative procedures. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science is the property of Open Library of Humanities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science holder: Open Library of Humanities dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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