The Responsible Subject in the Global Age.
The first thesis of this article is that the concept of responsibility takes on an unprecedented meaning in the twentieth century resulting from the emergence of a new dimension of the other: to be responsible comes to mean not just to account for oneself in relation to the other, but also to take t...
| Publicado en: | Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 16; no. 3; pp. 447 - 462 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=52799328&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 52799328 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13533452 GNI jtl: Science & Engineering Ethics issn: 13533452 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2010 vid: 16 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 52799328 10.1007/s11948-009-9175-9 ppf: 447 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 177KB tig: atl: The Responsible Subject in the Global Age. aug: au: Pulcini, Elena affil: Dipartimento di Filosofia, University of Florence, Via Bolognese 52, 50139 Florence, Italy su: Responsibility Risk Ethics Motivation (Psychology) Anthropology sug: subj: Responsibility Risk Ethics Motivation (Psychology) Anthropology keyword: Global risk Motivation Responsible subject Vulnerability ab: The first thesis of this article is that the concept of responsibility takes on an unprecedented meaning in the twentieth century resulting from the emergence of a new dimension of the other: to be responsible comes to mean not just to account for oneself in relation to the other, but also to take the other into account, to take care of the other—what I call responsibility towards ( the other). The main reason for this change consists in the emergence of global risks and the necessity, as underlined by Hans Jonas, to be responsible for the destiny of the world and future generations. The problem, as explored in the article’s second thesis, is that this implies the existence of a subject who is capable of responsibility. Jonas’s insights on this point are insufficient, since he only recognizes duty as the fundament for his ethics of responsibility and thus neglects the problem of motivation. This is a particularly crucial problem today as we are witnessing the presence of a pathological subject, characterized by a split in his faculties (between doing and imagining, knowing and feeling). To underline this fact, this article makes use of Günther Anders’s reflections, which provide a psycho-anthropological analysis of the subject, showing his pathologies and the necessity, from a moral perspective, to overcome his scission. Finally, this author suggests, as the article’s third thesis, that this overcoming is the necessary fundament for the perception of risk, which in turn reinstates the subject’s perception of his own vulnerability. Responsibility thus finds a motivation, which is neither altruistic nor duty-centred, in the awareness of our own vulnerability and the bond with the destiny of humankind as a whole. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Science & Engineering Ethics is a copyright of Springer, 2010. All Rights Reserved. item: Science & Engineering Ethics holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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