Objects of Interpretation.
The paper examines the relation between interpretation and the objects of interpretation, principally, but not exclusively, in the realm of art. Several theses are defended: that interpretation cannot proceed without prior determination of the kind of thing being interpreted; that the mode of interp...
| Publicado en: | Metaphilosophy Vol. 31; no. 1/2; pp. 96 - 125 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2000
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=5282021&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 5282021 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00261068 9OM jtl: Metaphilosophy issn: 00261068 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2000 vid: 31 iid: 1/2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 5282021 10.1111/1467-9973.00132 ppf: 96 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 98KB tig: atl: Objects of Interpretation. aug: au: Lamarque, Peter su: Hermeneutics Objectivism (Philosophy) sug: subj: Hermeneutics Objectivism (Philosophy) ab: The paper examines the relation between interpretation and the objects of interpretation, principally, but not exclusively, in the realm of art. Several theses are defended: that interpretation cannot proceed without prior determination of the kind of thing being interpreted; that the mode of interpretation is determined by the nature of its object; that interpretation, of a meaning-determining rather than generic kind, focuses at the level of works, not descending to a bedrock of “mere objects”; that because works and their appropriate mode of interpretation are constituted by convention-bound practices, it follows that no clear line can be drawn between properties “in” a work and those “imputed to” it through interpretive procedures endorsed by the practice. The debate over constructivism or “imputationalism” – between Margolis and Krausz, on the one hand, and Stecker and Levinson, on the other – is engaged with an attempt to show a core of truth in each of the conflicting theories, once the right distinction between object, work, and interpretation is in place. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Metaphilosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2000 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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