AGAINST METAETHICAL IMPERIALISM: Several Arguments for Equal Partnerships between the Deontic and Aretaic.

Virtue and deontological ethics are now commonly contrasted as rival approaches to moral inquiry. However, I argue that neither metaethical party should seek complete, solitary domination of the ethical domain. Reductive treatments of the right or the virtuous, as well as projects that abandon the f...

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Publicado en:Journal of Religious Ethics Vol. 38; no. 3; pp. 521 - 545
Autor principal: Couenhoven, Jesse
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Sep2010
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: AGAINST METAETHICAL IMPERIALISM: Several Arguments for Equal Partnerships between the Deontic and Aretaic.
      aug:
        au: Couenhoven, Jesse
        affil: Department of Humanities, Villanova University
      su:
        Essays
        Imperialism
        Deontic logic
        Moral proof of God
        Conduct of life
      sug:
        subj:
          Essays
          Imperialism
          Deontic logic
          Moral proof of God
          Conduct of life
      keyword:
        character
        deontology
        metaethics
        reductionism
        rules
        virtue
      ab: Virtue and deontological ethics are now commonly contrasted as rival approaches to moral inquiry. However, I argue that neither metaethical party should seek complete, solitary domination of the ethical domain. Reductive treatments of the right or the virtuous, as well as projects that abandon the former or latter, are bound to leave us with a sadly diminished map of the moral territories crucial to our lives. Thus, it is better for the two parties to seek a more cordial and equal relationship, one that permits metaethical pluralism, and acknowledges mutual dependence. I do not seek to prescribe how that relationship should look: this essay offers less a positive metaethical position than a prolegomenon to such a position, one that attempts to head off harmful attempts to reduce the territory of the aretaic to that of the deontic, or that of the deontic to the aretaic.
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    language: English
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