The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations.

The study asks why so many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established recently offices and policies intended to facilitate the oversight of their bureaucracies. It begins from a set of hypotheses derived from the principal-agent (PA) literature, a natural starting point for answering th...

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Publicado en:International Studies Quarterly Vol. 54; no. 3; pp. 871 - 887
Autor principal: Grigorescu, Alexandru
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Sep2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00613.x
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        au: Grigorescu, Alexandru
        affil: *Loyola University Chicago
      su:
        International agencies -- Rules & practice
        Management controls
        Auditing
        Bureaucracy
        Organizational change
        Organizational sociology research
        Finance
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        subj:
          International agencies -- Rules & practice
          Management controls
          Auditing
          Bureaucracy
          Organizational change
          Organizational sociology research
          Finance
      ab: The study asks why so many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established recently offices and policies intended to facilitate the oversight of their bureaucracies. It begins from a set of hypotheses derived from the principal-agent (PA) literature, a natural starting point for answering this question. It then considers explanations based on norms and institutional diffusion to offer a more complete explanation of developments. The study argues that the empowerment of democratic norms and institutional diffusion processes across IGOs have altered member-states’ preferences and allowed them to overcome collective action problems involved in the adoption of oversight mechanisms. The hypotheses are tested across more than 70 organizations. The results suggest that arguments extracted from the PA literature and the one on norms allow us to understand which IGOs are more likely to have bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. On the other hand, models that also take into account diffusion processes allow us to understand better when such mechanisms are adopted.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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