The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.
Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic reneg...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 81; no. 2; pp. 419 - 464 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=53767652&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 53767652 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2010 vid: 81 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 53767652 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00372.x ppf: 419 ppct: 45 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 237KB tig: atl: The Reflective Epistemic Renegade. aug: au: FRANCES, BRYAN affil: Fordham University su: Epistemics Philosophers Virtue epistemology Skepticism Modality (Theory of knowledge) sug: subj: Epistemics Philosophers Virtue epistemology Skepticism Modality (Theory of knowledge) ab: Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is blameworthy in her disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors. I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades. Finally, I show how a new kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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