The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism.

Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which typ...

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Publicado en:Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 81; no. 2; pp. 269 - 312
Autor principal: PICCININI, GUALTIERO
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Sep2010
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Mind & body
        Functionalism (Psychology)
        Computational neuroscience
        Plausibility (Logic)
        Functional analysis
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          Functionalism (Psychology)
          Computational neuroscience
          Plausibility (Logic)
          Functional analysis
      ab: Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism, recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify how functionalism and computationalism may or may not legitimately come together.
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