The Donor Problem: An Experimental Analysis of Beneficiary Empowerment.
Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. These recipients may, however, withhold complaints to 'thank' the intermediary for selecting them. Fu...
| Published in: | Journal of Development Studies Vol. 46; no. 8; pp. 1327 - 1345 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2010
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=53921599&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 53921599 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00220388 JDS jtl: Journal of Development Studies issn: 00220388 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2010 vid: 46 iid: 8 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 53921599 10.1080/00220380903428407 ppf: 1327 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 148KB tig: atl: The Donor Problem: An Experimental Analysis of Beneficiary Empowerment. aug: au: Abbink, Klaus Ellman, Matthew affil: University of Amsterdam (CREED), The Netherlands Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain su: Beneficiaries Charitable uses, trusts, & foundations Finance Developmental programs Industrial management Decentralization in management sug: subj: Beneficiaries Charitable uses, trusts, & foundations Finance Developmental programs Industrial management Decentralization in management ab: Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. These recipients may, however, withhold complaints to 'thank' the intermediary for selecting them. Furthermore, the intermediary may distort selection (for example, by picking richer recipients who feel less entitled) to reduce complaints. We design an experimental game representing the donor's problem. We compare two institutions. In one treatment the intermediary selects recipients. In the other selection is random - as by an uninformed donor. In our data random selection dominates delegation of the selection task to the intermediary. Selection distortions are similar but intermediaries divert more when they have selection power (correctly anticipating that gratitude for selection will reduce complaints). Our results identify a problem in combining selection and delivery tasks. The insights are also applicable to social funds, decentralisation and participatory projects. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Development Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Development Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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