Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background Beliefs.

Some prominent accounts of scientific evidence treat evidence as an unrelativized concept. But whether belief in a hypothesis is justified seems relative to the epistemic situation of the believer. The issue becomes yet more complicated in the context of group epistemic agents, for then one confront...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) Vol. 7; no. 3; pp. 232 - 248
Autor principal: Staley, Kent W.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Edinburgh University Press 2010
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=54621083&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 54621083
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        17423600
        UP0
      jtl: Episteme (Edinburgh University Press)
      issn: 17423600
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: 2010
      vid: 7
      iid: 3
      pid: 2327
      pub: Edinburgh University Press
    artinfo:
      ui:
        54621083
        10.3366/epi.2010.0205
      ppf: 232
      ppct: 16
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 119KB
      tig:
        atl: Evidence and Justification in Groups with Conflicting Background Beliefs.
      aug:
        au: Staley, Kent W.
      su:
        Evidence
        Epistemics
        Hypothesis
        Pragmatics
        Belief & doubt
        Problem solving
        Theory of knowledge
      sug:
        subj:
          Evidence
          Epistemics
          Hypothesis
          Pragmatics
          Belief & doubt
          Problem solving
          Theory of knowledge
      ab: Some prominent accounts of scientific evidence treat evidence as an unrelativized concept. But whether belief in a hypothesis is justified seems relative to the epistemic situation of the believer. The issue becomes yet more complicated in the context of group epistemic agents, for then one confronts the problem of relativizing to an epistemic situation that may include conflicting beliefs. As a step toward resolution of these difficulties, an ideal of justification is here proposed that incorporates both an unrelativized evidence requirement and the requirement of the security of the evidence on which a conclusion from data is based. The latter requirement incorporates the consideration of epistemic modal statements.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Episteme (Edinburgh University Press) is the property of Edinburgh University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Episteme (Edinburgh University Press)
      holder: Edinburgh University Press
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2010
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N