A refutation of the Doomsday Argument.

Analyzes Brandon Carter and John Leslie's theory of the Doomsday Argument. Why was the Doomsday Argument conceived; Reference to the article `Nature,' by Richard Gott; What is the Doomsday Argument; Information on the concept of the Doomsday Argument.

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 107; no. 426; pp. 403 - 411
Autores principales: Korb, Kevin B., Oliver, Jonathan J.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Apr98
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=550178&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 550178
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00264423
        MND
      jtl: Mind (0026-4423)
      issn: 00264423
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr98
      vid: 107
      iid: 426
      pid: 622
      pub: Oxford University Press / USA
    artinfo:
      ui:
        550178
        10.1093/mind/107.426.403
      ppf: 403
      ppct: 8
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 30KB
      tig:
        atl: A refutation of the Doomsday Argument.
      aug:
        au:
          Korb, Kevin B.
          Oliver, Jonathan J.
      su:
        Carter, Brandon
        Leslie, John
        Judgment Day
        Criticism
      sug:
        subj:
          Carter, Brandon
          Leslie, John
          Judgment Day
          Criticism
      ab: Analyzes Brandon Carter and John Leslie's theory of the Doomsday Argument. Why was the Doomsday Argument conceived; Reference to the article `Nature,' by Richard Gott; What is the Doomsday Argument; Information on the concept of the Doomsday Argument.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: © 2019 Mind Association.
      item: Mind (0026-4423)
      holder: Oxford University Press / USA
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 1998
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N